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Policy Options for Filling Gaps in 
the Health Insurance Coverage of 
Older Workers and Early Retirees
Len M. Nichols 
The Urban Institute
This chapter offers answers to two questions concerning the health 
insurance of Americans between the ages of 55 and 64: 1) who has the 
greatest need for health insurance policy intervention? and 2) which 
types of policies are likely to be most effective for these subgroups? 
The chapter draws upon recent literature and other chapters of this 
book. I present a brief analysis of a broad range of policy options, as 
well as some quantitative simulation exercises which highlight key fea 
tures of alternative targeted coverage strategies. While care was taken 
to make the estimates realistic, all simulations are at best illustrative of 
certain principles and should not be interpreted as definitive estimates 
of the cost or coverage impacts of particular proposals. Finally, I use 
the lessons from the examples to explore a relatively new way of think 
ing about financing subsidies for the purchase of health insurance. 
This view may have particular relevance for the age 55-64 cohort as it 
grows in the coming decades.
WHO HAS THE GREATEST NEED FOR HEALTH 
INSURANCE POLICY INTERVENTION?
Recent policy discussions of coverage expansion options often 
focus on children or their parents, partly because members of the age 
55-64 cohort are among the non-elderly most likely to have health 
insurance in the United States (Campbell 1999; Swartz and Stevenson 
2001). Swartz and Stevenson report that only 15 percent of this group 
lacked health insurance in 1998, compared with 30 percent of 18- to 
24-year-olds and 24 percent of 25- to 34-year-olds. Only the prime age
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working population, 45-54, had a lower incidence of being uninsured 
(13.6 percent).
However, a compelling case can be made that the consequences of 
being without health insurance are potentially much more damaging to 
this oldest pre-Medicare cohort than to other non-elderly citizens, for 
two reasons. First, the financial risk of no coverage is greater.
Table 1, constructed with 1987 National Medical Expenditure Sur 
vey (NMES) data, makes the point about higher financial risk. It 
reports ratios of per capita spending amounts for all adults, not just 
workers, by age and health status category. It shows that a 55- to 64- 
year-old man in good health (self-reporting excellent or good) should 
expect to spend 2.5 times as much as a young man (21-29) in equally 
good health. But the age-cost gradient is steeper for men in bad health 
(fair or poor), at 4.2. For women, the direction is the same, but the 
severity of the effect is less, largely because maternity costs are associ 
ated with younger women. Interestingly, the pure health status gradi 
ent is identical across genders at 2.7. Thus, the near-elderly in bad 
health can expect to spend 2.7 times as much as their cohort counter 
parts in good health.
Table 2 shows the percentage of each age cohort, by gender, that 
reported fair or poor health status in the 1987 NMES. These data show 
that the incidence of bad health increases dramatically with age. So, 
while they are relatively well covered as a group, 55- to 64-year-olds 
are indeed more likely to be financially vulnerable to the absence of 
health insurance coverage than other non-elderly Americans; they can 
expect to spend more if uninsured for both age and declining health 
status reasons.
Table 1 Per-Capita Spending Ratios by Gender, Age, and Health Status
Males Females
Good health3 Bad health Good health Bad health
Ages 55-64 / 21-29 2.5 4.2 1.3 1.9 
Age 55-64, bad/good health — 2.7 — 2.7
SOURCE: Author's calculations using 1987 NMES data. 
a Good health = excellent or good; bad health = fair or poor
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Table 2 Share of Each Age Group in Fair or Poor 
Health Status (%)
Age Men Women 
21-29 8^8 12X) 
30-54 14.8 18.1 
55-64 34.1 35.6 
SOURCE: Author's tabulations using 1987 NMES.
Second, potentially greater vulnerability from having no health 
insurance is greater health risk. Many studies have found that the unin 
sured enjoy less access to care and that both their health status and 
mortality risk are worse than is the case for the insured (Franks, 
Clancy, and Gold 1993, Franks et al. 1993). None as yet (to my knowl 
edge) have found an age-related dimension to worsened outcomes or 
greater health risk from being uninsured, but this is surely a testable 
hypothesis. If it turns out to be true, this would strengthen the case for 
why the 55- to 64-year-old cohort should be a policy priority. If the 
hypothesis is false, then the case for helping 55- to 64-year-olds is 
mostly financial (there would still be access differentials relative to 
need, since their average need is greater than younger cohorts).
Having established that the age 55-64 cohort deserves policy 
attention, who within the cohort is the most deserving? The usual and 
correct answers are the low income and those with low (fair or poor) 
health status. These two groups always fare less well in the U.S. sys 
tem of voluntary insurance markets, because comprehensive health 
insurance is now very expensive relative to low incomes and because 
insurers protect themselves against adverse selection by imposing lim 
its, restrictions, and outright refusals to insure at any price for some 
preexisting conditions (Chollet and Kirk 1998; GAO 1998). Among 
the 55-64 cohort, those living in family units with income less than 
200 percent of poverty (hereafter, low-income family units) comprise 
half the uninsured in the cohort, and those with fair or poor status 
regardless of income comprise 26 percent of the uninsured in the age 
group. Seventeen percent of the uninsured in this cohort are both low- 
income and in bad health.
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It is important to remember, as Swartz and Stevenson (2001) and 
Pollitz (2001) report, that public insurance programs play a vital role 
for the sickest in this age group, covering about 10 percent of all 55- to 
64-year-olds but over half of those who report not working because 
they are ill or disabled. Given the size of the uninsured population who 
report fair or poor health status to survey researchers, the public pro 
grams are clearly not able to cover all those who need coverage and 
can't afford to buy it on their own. Still, without Medicare and Medic- 
aid's disabled and medically needy programs, the coverage problem of 
this age group would be much worse. Also note that because Medicaid 
and Medicare cover the most disabled of the cohort, the risk of adverse 
selection from expanding voluntary coverage options for this age group 
is somewhat reduced.
Swartz and Stevenson report that some subgroups are particularly 
likely to be uninsured. The unmarried, especially women, and those 
who had lost a spouse to death or changing circumstance (separated 
and divorced) of both genders were more likely to be uninsured. 
Never-married women are particularly vulnerable. Women in general 
are more likely to rely on nongroup insurance (Swartz and Stevenson 
2001), which is less stable in an underwriting environment (which pre 
vails in most of the United States) than is group or public insurance. 
Thus, the most in need of policy intervention are the low-income and 
the less-healthy, especially women.
Predictable Future Strains
This picture is bleak enough for those who are other than healthy, 
married, high-income workers, but two trends make it imperative that 
policymakers begin to consider coverage expansion options for this 
population in a serious way: the size of the aging baby-boomer cohort 
and the decline of employer-sponsored retiree health insurance. In 
1998, there were 22.9 million people between the ages of 55 and 64; by 
2008, there will be 35.2 million. So whatever unique problems they 
have in getting and keeping health insurance coverage, these problems 
are going to increase in aggregate magnitude by roughly half in the 
coming decade.
In addition, a major pillar of coverage for 55- to 64-year-olds, 
employer-sponsored retirement health insurance (RHI), is eroding.
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Partly due to an accounting rule change that created strong incentives 
to drop RHI and immediately improve a company's balance sheet and 
stock price, and partly due to the changing labor market in which RHI 
is perceived as less crucial to attract good workers in an increasingly 
mobile global economy, there is a clear tendency on the part of 
employers to reduce the generosity of postretirement health insurance 
offerings (GAO 1998; McArdle et al. 1999). Between 1985 and 1993, 
the fraction of workers with access to employer-sponsored retirement 
health insurance declined from about 75 percent to about 50 percent 
(U.S. Department of Labor 1995). Perhaps most ominously, even large 
firms are both dropping RHI and charging early retirees higher and 
higher premiums for such coverage (McArdle et al. 1999; Loprest and 
Zedlewski 1998). Employer surveys indicate that fewer workers are 
likely to have access to RHI in the future (McArdle et al. 1999).
Of course, the other side of the coin is that the absence of good 
early retirement health insurance options probably keeps workers in 
the labor force longer (Johnson, Davidoff, and Perese 2000; Karoly and 
Rogowski 1998; Gruber and Madrian 1995). If public policy were to 
make generous subsidies widely available, rates of declines in labor 
force participation by older workers could regain their 1970s momen 
tum (Blau and Gilleskie 1997). Of course, some retirements are invol 
untary and health-related, even though the person might not be 
disabled enough to qualify for Medicare or Medicaid. Striking a bal 
ance here is clearly important, and thus any new subsidy proposal must 
be mindful of likely labor force (and payroll tax base) effects. These 
effects have been established qualitatively, but no consensus has been 
reached on the magnitude of likely responses to subsidies of varying 
degrees. This is an important and active area of research. 1
WHICH TYPES OF POLICIES ARE LIKELY TO BE MOST 
EFFECTIVE FOR THE NEEDIEST SUBGROUPS, THE 
LOW-INCOME AND THOSE WITH HEALTH PROBLEMS?
There are two key dimensions to coverage expansion policies for 
the near-elderly: the subsidy mechanism and the range of market 
opportunities for insurance or health services on which the beneficiary
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may spend the subsidy. The interactions of these dimensions is crucial 
in determining the ultimate effect of any policy initiative, and thus they 
really should be considered in tandem. To that end, I present Table 3, 
which should be thought of as a 4 x 3 matrix, each cell of which is a 
potential type of coverage expansion policy. This table tries to help the 
reader see that both dimensions are key to understanding the full set of 
implications about each policy alternative.
In this section, I briefly discuss some pros and cons of each 
approach.
COBRA Extensions
What I mean by mandates are laws forcing employers to make 
COBRA coverage available to workers for longer periods of time after 
they leave the firm. Under current law, if an employer offers insurance 
to active workers, then workers who sever employment (in firms with 
more than 20 workers) for any reason must be offered the option of 
continuing to enroll in the employer's plan—in exchange for paying 
102 percent of the total premium—for as long as 18 months (and 
longer under certain circumstances). COBRA provides bridge cover 
age to Medicare for many individuals who retire before age 65 
(Loprest and Zedlewski 1998). The idea behind extending COBRA is
Table 3 Policy Options for Filling Health Insurance Coverage Gaps for 
55- to 64-Year-Olds
Existing nsk
Current Reformed pools5 or New 
nongroup nongroup Group Purchasing 
Subsidy mechanism market market3 Authority















a Guaranteed issue, premium restrictions, etc.
b Purchasing co-ops, FEHBP, Medicaid, Medicare, state high-risk or HIPAA pools.
c NA = not applicable.
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to permit access to the group market longer, maybe 36 months or until 
the age of Medicare eligibility is reached (this is sometimes offered as 
a complement to proposals to raise the age of Medicare eligibility to 
67). The virtue of extending COBRA is that access to a shared-risk 
pool (the employer group) would be enhanced at low (nominally zero) 
cost to the federal government.
The downsides to COBRA extensions are 1) it does nothing for 
nonworkers save dependents of recent retirees; 2) while lower than 
most nongroup premiums, 102 percent of the employer premium is still 
more than many early retirees can afford to pay; and most seriously, 3) 
it constitutes an implicit tax on existing workers and firms, since wages 
will (on average) be lowered to pay for the higher premiums required 
to cover the cost of retirees. There would also be a second-order reduc 
tion in federal tax revenues, since wages are taxed and employer-pro 
vided health insurance premium payments are not. Thus, COBRA 
extensions are not "free" and, on the whole, do not seem to be a partic 
ularly effective way of extending coverage to those in this cohort who 
need it most. Recall, many of those most in need for early retiree 
health insurance worked for firms that did not offer employer-spon 
sored insurance to active workers. Having access to COBRA is fairly 
highly correlated with income in the first place (Loprest and Zedlewski 
1998).
Public Program Expansions
An administratively straightforward way to expand coverage for 
those most in need would be to change eligibility for Medicaid or 
Medicare or both. These programs already serve the very sick and dis 
abled (see Pollitz [2001] for a brief overview of each), and Medicaid 
also covers many low-income individuals, though typically much 
younger than this cohort. This approach, like the COBRA extension, 
would permit coverage expansion to avoid the complexities and ineffi 
ciencies of the private nongroup insurance market. These complexities 
can be severe, as we discuss presently.
The downsides to public program expansion are partly technical 
but mostly political. The technical problem is in "slightly" increasing 
the range of conditions or functional diagnoses that are considered 
"disabled" enough to merit inclusion in either Medicare or Medicaid.
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There is concern and some evidence that medical judgments are incon 
sistent and elastic, leading to an "endogenous" assignment of disability 
that could expand public program rolls well beyond the intent of the 
law and agreed upon medical need (Kubik 1996).
The larger objections to public program eligibility expansions are 
political. The obvious point is the considerable resistance in the Con 
gress to expanding any entitlement program, especially our entitlement 
insurance programs. In addition, if Medicaid—the joint state and fed 
eral program—is the preferred vehicle (and in general it has been the 
program expanded to accept broader definitions of disability in recent 
years), then truly effective expansion requires states to share the new 
federal goals, for they will be asked to spend their own money on this. 
The variance in state coverage and enrollment of different types of 
Medicaid eligibles suggests that this "goal sharing" should not be taken 
for granted.
Tax Credits
In contrast to public program eligibility expansion, there is cur 
rently something of a groundswell of bipartisan political support for 
tax credits that could be used for the purchase of health insurance. 
Briefly put, many are attracted to the principle of tax credits, even if 
there is no agreement yet on key details. This movement seems to be 
propelled by a confluence of forces in support of one or more of the 
following: 1) tax equity (why subsidize employer premiums but not the 
self-employed or nonworkers?); 2) individual choice (partly philosoph 
ical and partly a more subtle form of the current backlash against man 
aged care, led by those who have a strong stake in the fee-for-service 
system and blame employers for foisting managed care on workers); 3) 
target efficiency (which tax credits can be designed to be); and 4) tax 
cuts (as tax credits can be described for political purposes). Two recent 
papers have analyzed tax credits of various forms (Gruber and Levitt 
2000; Pauly and Herring 1999b) for the general non-elderly popula 
tion.
The major downside of tax credits is that they must be adminis 
tered within the income tax system. This makes it difficult to reach 
those who have no federal tax liability and do not file tax returns 
(approximately 45 percent of the uninsured in all age brackets [Gruber
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and Levitt 2000]). The tax system is a cumbersome avenue for any eli 
gible person of a means-tested program. (The opposition of Treasury 
professionals to administering subsidies through the tax system is leg 
endary inside the Beltway). Thus, using the tax system to administer a 
subsidy is likely to result in lower enrollment than would subsidies of 
equal size that could be obtained with less applicant and administrative 
burden. Second (and related), for tax credits to work well for the target 
low-income population, they must be both refundable (for those with 
zero or low tax liabilities) and available when premiums must be paid, 
i.e., up front, not in April of the following year. The low-income popu 
lation cannot finance health insurance with an interest-free loan, other 
wise they wouldn't need a subsidy in the first place. Refundability and 
prepayment raise serious year-end reconciliation complexities and 
potential reductions in target efficiency. Finally, as Pauly and Herring 
show and others have long stated (Blumberg 1999), tax credits must be 
fairly large to do any good at all for the low-income population. This is 
not a critique of tax credits per se, but rather a statement that they may 
work better for lower middle-income people than for the truly low- 
income population.
Direct Subsidies
Direct subsidies (a new program, not an extension of Medicare or 
Medicaid) could be designed to have the technical advantages of tax 
credits (target efficiency, horizontal equity) without the administrative 
disadvantages of using the tax system for a means-tested subsidy pro 
gram. This is not to say that the administrative difficulties of setting up 
a new subsidy program are trivial. But the motivating idea of a "new 
and different" subsidy program would be to provide direct purchasing 
power (and, perhaps, health plan purchasing expertise; more on this 
later in the discussion of market opportunities) without the regulations 
and complex vendor-relations histories of Medicare and Medicaid.
One downside of a new direct subsidy program is shared with tax 
credits, and that is that the subsidies must be large to engender much 
new coverage. The resulting public price tag contributes to direct sub 
sidies' major political problem, the absence of a widely shared new 
political vision for a new expansive health insurance entitlement.
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Using the Current Nongroup Market
The nongroup health insurance market is functional in all 50 states 
and works better than its reputation in some health policy circles, at 
least according to a new book by Mark Pauly and Brad Herring 
(1999a). They make one overarching and controversial empirical 
claim: risks are pooled to nearly equal (and imperfect) degrees by 
large-group, small-group, and nongroup insurers. They conclude that 
there is no systematic empirical evidence of aggressive risk rating by 
nongroup insurers.
Even if one accepts Pauly and Herring's new empirical claims (and 
I suspect they will remain controversial for at least a while yet), their 
fundamental deduction is that the primary differences between insur 
ance markets stem from their inherently different administrative load 
ing costs. Group insurance can exploit economies of scale and thus 
costs less than nongroup insurance can. Thus, high administrative 
costs are a major downside of the current nongroup market.
Other reports about the actual workings of the nongroup market are 
not so sanguine on the relative absence of aggressive risk rating (Chol 
let and Kirk 1998; GAO 1997; Hall 2000). Also, recall that risk rating, 
as well as age rating (which is ubiquitous and quite reasonable given 
the expenditure facts presented in Table 1), means that people in our 
cohort will pay higher equilibrium premiums under the current non- 
group market's relative laissez faire regulation, even if they can on 
average find policies to buy as Pauly's empirical results suggest. So, 
paying more for a given set of benefits plus paying a higher administra 
tive load is the reality for 55- to 64-year-olds in the unreformed non- 
group market.
Reforming the Nongroup Market
Almost all discussions of the actual behavior of nongroup insurers 
(Hall 1999; Chollet and Kirk 1998), as opposed to the empirical results 
of Pauly and Herring, invariably lead to calls for some kind of reforms 
(Swartz and Garnick 2000; Chollet and Kirk 2000; Hall 2000). The 
basic idea is that guaranteed issue and restrictions on premium vari 
ances would guarantee access at affordable prices for most people try 
ing to purchase coverage in the nongroup market. A reformed
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nongroup market could indeed look a great deal friendlier to the garden 
variety 55- to 64-year-old than it does in most states today (Pollitz 
2001 ;BCBSA 1999).
However, reforms that increase access for older and sicker would- 
be purchasers raise average premiums and are quite likely to raise by a 
substantial amount the premiums of most of those who were purchas 
ing in the prereform environment (Nichols 2000). Empirical evidence 
on the effect of nongroup reforms is scant if not rare, but the studies 
that have been done uniformly find that nongroup reforms do indeed 
reduce net insurance coverage overall (Marsteller et al. 1998; Zucker- 
man and Rajan 1999; Sloan and Conover 1998). Thus, while reforms 
would undoubtedly help some (perhaps especially those 55-64 with 
the greatest health needs), these reforms would also likely cause others 
to pay more and might cause them to go without coverage altogether.
Perhaps those who would obtain or would retain coverage in a 
reformed nongroup insurance environment have worse health status 
than those who voluntarily drop coverage because of premium 
increases. This is an important area of future research which is not 
well known at the moment. There are also case studies of how reforms 
have been implemented with relatively little obvious downsides 
(Swartz and Garnick 2000; Hall 2000; Nichols 2000). But these suc 
cessful implementation strategies require a degree of political will 
(e.g., requiring group insurers to offer products in the nongroup mar 
ket) that is not present in most states and does not appear to be present 
in Congress either.
Buying into Existing Risk Pools
If an unreformed nongroup market is unpalatable to most observers 
and a reformed nongroup market is fraught with tradeoffs for the 
unsubsidized to bear, then allowing 55- to 64-year-olds to take their tax 
credit or direct subsidy into a group setting to purchase health insur 
ance makes a tremendous amount of sense. Large pools exist and 
could be expanded at much lower administrative costs than either type 
of nongroup market could offer. Furthermore, they provide natural and 
existing risk-pooling mechanisms. Among the more attractive options 
are statewide purchasing cooperatives for employees of small busi 
nesses (CHIP in California), the Federal Employees Health Benefit
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Plan (FEHBP), or state employee plans (e.g., CALPERS in California). 
In addition, administrative and marketing efficiencies would result if 
new subsidies of whatever form were allowed to be used to buy into 
Medicare or Medicaid. Finally, state high-risk pools or the mecha 
nisms created by states to comply with HIPAA "federal eligibles" 
could also be opened up to the new beneficiaries at relatively low 
administrative costs.
The downside of using existing pools is that existing members 
might not be willing to be rated collectively with the new enrollees, 
especially if they turned out to be higher than average risks, even con 
trolling for age. Conversely, the new enrollees might not like being 
charged actuarially fair premiums with high-risk pool members, if that 
were the mechanism of choice. But once the decision is made to rate 
the populations separately, some of the administrative efficiencies of 
group purchase would be lost.
Allowing the newly subsidized 55- to 64-year-olds to buy into pub 
lic programs would not raise cost issues, because these programs are 
and would remain free to currently qualified beneficiaries. However, if 
the new enrollees got substantially different benefit packages—for 
example, if they got prescription drug coverage through a Medicare + 
Choice HMO—there might be stronger equity-based opposition raised 
by current beneficiaries. Further, deciding what price to charge the 
"buying" enrollees is no simple matter for a public program, for here 
the relative risk-rating heterogeneity and controversies seep back into 
the calculation.
Organizing New Risk Pools and Purchasing Authorities
Alternatively, with a new federal health insurance subsidy program 
targeted directly at 55- to 64-year-olds, the government could set up a 
whole new purchasing agency, modeled after the best private or public 
health plan purchasing agencies, that would organize enrollment and 
health plan options for the new beneficiaries. This entity could write 
RFPs and negotiate with health plans and insurers, while coordinating 
enrollment, beneficiary plan choice, and financial transactions to maxi 
mize administrative efficiencies for all. Eligibility standards would 
have to be established and enforced, but these functions have to be per 
formed somewhere by someone. Creating a whole new purchasing
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agent would have the major virtue of allowing the new program to 
establish its own relations with beneficiaries, vendors, and insurers 
without the legacies and resentments each might bring from the Medic- 
aid or Medicare programs. It may also be the only quick way to get 
creative about risk adjusting and competitive bidding, both of which 
may be particularly helpful for insuring the 55-64 population, as we 
shall discuss later after presenting some simulation results.
The downside of a new agency is that it would surely cost more to 
run at the outset than the marginal cost of adding these functions to 
existing Medicare or Medicaid programs. Plus, it would be vulnerable 
to the charge of government proliferation, since a new federal entity 
would be born. These disadvantages would have to be weighed against 
the potential long-run advantages of freedom from existing programs' 
rules. The ultimate judgment may hinge upon how much like a private 
sector "sponsor,"—e.g., the Buyer's Health Care Action Group in Min 
nesota or the Pacific Business Group on Health in San Francisco— 
Congress would want this new purchasing agent to be. The more free 
dom to contract and aggressive use of government bargaining power on 
behalf of beneficiary choices and welfare are valued, the more likely 
the optimal choice would be a new entity. However, if the public orga 
nization of subsidized beneficiaries' purchase of participating health 
plans is intended to be as passive as most Medicare and Medicaid 
health plan purchasing has been to date, i.e., if policymakers think of 
the program as a provider support device as much as a beneficiary sub 
sidy mechanism, then creating a new entity is not likely to be worth the 
political and administrative trouble.
A FEW SPECIFIC POLICY SIMULATIONS
In this section, I present some simulation results of the policy 
options that seem promising and efficient enough to be feasible in our 
current political environment of parsimony towards coverage expan 
sions (i.e., they are on a financial scale commensurate with Vice Presi 
dent Gore's proposal to cover parents of Medicaid and CHIP children 
and Governor Bush's modest tax credit proposal). Table 4 presents 
some contextual facts and basic assumptions.
464 Nichols
Table 4 Some Basic Facts and Assumptions





Low income and bad health 2.6
Est. standard premium ($) 2,500
Est. high-risk premium ($) 6,750
Est. community rate ($) 3,900
SOURCE: 1999 CPS and author's calculations in 1998 dol 
lars.
First, recall that there are approximately 23 million people between 
55 and 64 today. About 3.4 million are uninsured, while another 2 mil 
lion purchase coverage in the nongroup market, and thus their hold on 
health insurance is more tenuous than those insured through work (past 
or present) or in public programs. About 6 million people in this 
cohort have incomes below 200 percent of poverty, and 5.4 million 
report fair or poor health status. Finally, 2.6 million are estimated to 
have both low income and bad health status.
The key assumption in all policy analyses of coverage expansions 
is the premium that must be paid for the desired insurance product, for 
this parameter simultaneously determines both total program cost and 
enrollment (conditional on the income distribution) in the likely event 
that some (maybe all) will be made eligible for a partial subsidy. With 
out exaggeration, one can state that the reliability, representativeness, 
and quality of publicly available premium data for the nongroup mar 
ket range from fair to poor. I consulted studies of the nongroup market 
(GAO 1998; Chollett and Kirk 1998; Chollett 2000; Kirk 2000; Swartz 
and Garnick 2000; Hall 2000; Pauly and Herring 1999a), high-risk 
pools (Communicating for Agriculture 1999), analyses of Medicare 
buy-in proposals (Loprest and Moon 1999; CBO 1998), and both 
NMES and MEPS data (the latter supplied by John Eisenberg). The 
premium assumptions in Table 4 represent a judgmental average of all
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the above sources, where each source estimate or fact was adjusted to 
account for the particular nature of the underlying pool.
For example, high-risk pool premiums must be adjusted for the 
fact that they are set below the actuarial value, but claims and adminis 
trative costs are published along with premium receipts, so this is fairly 
simple. What is not published is the degree to which adverse selection 
into high-risk pools is likely worse than would result from the kinds of 
subsidy programs for the persons aged 55-64 who are uninsured (and 
thus not in a state high-risk pool) today. CBO and others made analo 
gous adjustments from the published estimates of nongroup premiums 
when predicting who would take a Medicare buy-in option. In addi 
tion, MEPS data were provided for workers only, and they are healthier 
than nonworkers in every age cohort. The NMES per capita spending 
data are in the public domain, and the data based on them that I pre 
sented in Tables 1 and 2 are for all 55- to 64-year-olds. They include 
nonworkers, obviously, but have the disadvantage of also including 
publicly insured individuals who are unlikely to switch into the new 
subsidy program and are most likely to be the sickest of all. Plus, the 
NMES data are from 1987, and while they can be "aged" using HCFA's 
national health account growth rates, the delivery system is quite dif 
ferent today, so the age- and health status gradients may have changed 
(though I suspect not much). 2
I welcome suggestions for better ways to estimate premiums for 
these kinds of policies, but I believe these estimates are at least "in the 
town the ballpark is in," to invoke Bob Reischauer's famous descrip 
tion of health reform estimates, and that will suffice for discussion pur 
poses at least. The important fact to note about them is the gap 
between the high-risk premium ($6,750) and the standard premium 
($2,500). The former are computed for those with fair or poor health 
status, and the latter for those in excellent or good health. The commu 
nity rate ($3,900) represents the weighted average of each type of per 
son if all nonpublicly insured 55- to 64-year-olds were to become 
insured through the hypothetical new subsidy program and the ratio of 
(fair + poor) -=- total is the same as in 1987.
Table 5 summarizes and compares the three subsidy policy initia 
tives I explore in some detail. My objective is to maximize coverage of 
the target population at minimum cost, so in each case, I assume a 
direct subsidy (to maximize participation and target efficiency) and that
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Table 5 Subsidy Options Simulated
Income-based subsidy for 55-64 year olds
100% for those below poverty
Sliding scale between 100-200%
Not available for those m public, with ESI/RHI
Group purchase mechanism 
Health status-based subsidy for 55-64 year olds
100% for those with fair or poor health
Not available for those in public, with ESI/RHI
Group purchase mechanism 
Income and health status-based subsidy for 55-64 year olds
100% for low income with bad health
Not available for those in public, with ESI/RHI
Group purchase mechanism
beneficiaries will be allowed to select plans through some kind of 
group purchasing mechanism, the exact nature of which is not speci 
fied. To be conservative, I assume this group purchasing agent is less 
efficient than either Medicare or large employers, and I therefore 
assign an administrative load on expected health care costs (which 
includes eligibility determination costs plus the agency's and the 
insurer's administrative costs) of 20 percent. Other institutional 
assumptions are that beneficiaries will be guaranteed issue (i.e., no one 
can be denied coverage because of health status) and that the newly 
subsidized population will be rated separately from participants in cur 
rent markets. In each case, I assume the subsidy is targeted and avail 
able only to those who are not currently enrolled in a public program 
and do not have access to ESI/RHI, but I presume that 90 percent of 
current participants in the nongroup market who are made eligible will 
participate in the program, and that 10 percent of those with ESI/RHI 
will drift over into the program either by choice or because their 
employers will induce or force them to.
The first policy is targeted to low-income 55- to 64-year-olds. It 
would provide 100 percent of the cost of a plan (presumed to cost the
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community rate of $3,900 in the income-related case) for all persons 
55-64 who have incomes at or below poverty and who are not eligible 
for Medicare or Medicaid and without access to ESI or RHI. Starting 
at incomes just above 100 percent of poverty, subsidies (and participa 
tion) decline along a sliding scale to 0 at 200 percent of poverty.
The second policy is targeted at those who have the greatest health 
needs. It would grant a 100 percent subsidy to all persons with fair or 
poor health, regardless of income. The price of coverage for each of 
these persons is presumed to be $6,750. Eligibility for this kind of pol 
icy could be determined or certified by physicians, in a process similar 
to the individual functional assessment test now given to potentially 
"disabled" Medicaid enrollees. Alternatively, and preferably from my 
point of view, one can imagine using a kind of underwriting process, 
similar to that used by nongroup insurers all the time, but in coopera 
tion with the purchasing authority so it can be standardized across 
plans. Postenrollment encounter data could be required of participat 
ing health plans to assess the accuracy of ex ante assessments, and this 
would work best if a competitive bidding process was also imple 
mented to set the price the government pays for this population.
In essence, this option is for the government to become an orga 
nized purchaser for those between 55 and 64 and in poor health. 3 In 
principle, there is no reason that moral hazard on the part of insurers 
should be debilitating for this scheme, and competitive bidding (and 
concomitant data reporting requirements just like private sector orga 
nized purchasers use) may be all that is necessary to minimize this risk 
and monitor the effectiveness of competition. If insurers can define 
health states that we agree deserve this kind of subsidy, then we can 
write an RFP for covering people who possess them and competitive 
bidding should be able to elicit a fair price for the government to pay. 
"Fair + poor" self-reported health status is merely a simplified way I 
can approximate a concept like "bad health" using nationally represen 
tative survey data. Using all of those currently reporting fair and poor 
health in the analysis of this option probably represents an upper bound 
of the numbers of people that AHRQ and private insurers would 
declare to be possessors of the appropriately targeted health states, i.e., 
those that lie between current definitions of disabled and the health sta 
tus level underlying the concept of "standard" risk in the insurance 
industry. Competitive bidding is a powerful tool for eliciting cost-
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based prices of services that has typically been absent when Medicaid 
and Medicare disability determination were being made. At a mini 
mum, it seems worth provoking a conversation about how this might be 
implemented, if people do agree that helping those with low health sta 
tus is a primary goal for coverage expansion policy, especially for the 
55-64 population which has a far greater percentage of members with 
fair + poor health status than the nonelderly age cohorts (remember 
Table 2).
The third policy explored is a combination income-health status 
subsidy. The idea is to provide 100 percent for all the low-income per 
sons who also have fair or poor health status. Again, the subsidy would 
not be available to those who have public coverage or access to ESI/ 
RHI.
Table 6 reports the bottom line results of these policy simulations.4 
No subsidy approach dominates in all dimensions, so that a case can be 
made for and against each of the subsidy targets. They were of course 
designed to illustrate certain prototypical features of each subsidy type.
The income-only subsidy covers the most people and is relatively 
target-efficient. The health-status-only subsidy costs more, but covers 
the vast majority of those with a compelling and unmet health-status- 
related demand for health insurance. The income + health status sub 
sidy is cheaper and more efficient than the health-status-only subsidy 
alone, for it covers 55 percent of the fair + poor people at 65 percent of 
the cost of the health-status-only subsidy scheme. This is because the 
fair + poor are more numerous in the lower income ranges.
Table 6 Simulated Results of Policy Options
Basis for subsidy
Newly covered (millions)
% of uninsured newly covered
% of uninsured in fair/poor health covered
Total cost ($, billions)




















SOURCE: Author's calculations using CPS, NMES, MEPS, and other data.
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The relative efficiency of income + health status-based subsidies 
for this population is appealing to the economist in me, but it does 
leave out those in poor health at higher incomes. One might infer that 
those who remain uninsured do so voluntarily, since their families have 
means, but two facts about the current nongroup market in most states 
give pause to reaching this conclusion. First, in most states, insurers 
are allowed to refuse to sell in the nongroup market except to the rela 
tively small number of HIPAA eligibles. Pauly and Herring report that 
if the underwriting process leads a nongroup insurer to think that a per 
son's health merits a premium of 3 times standard, they most often 
refuse to sell at all. Recall that the NMES data support the existence of 
a 2.7 health status multiple within the 55-64 age cohort. If nongroup 
insurers measure applicants' health risks relative to the population stan 
dard, as seems likely, then many of those with fair or poor health status 
who are uninsured despite having higher incomes may very well have 
had trouble finding a willing seller. Second, even if they could find a 
willing seller at actuarially fair prices, the $6,750 price I estimated is 
more than 10 percent of income until income exceeds 8 times poverty 
(for single individuals). And of course, some insurers may offer a price 
far above the actuarially fair one in order to discourage purchases by 
individuals who are feared to be quite sick.
This price/income fact made me think about an addition to the 
income + health-based subsidy, an addition that relates to a choice 
between subsidies and separate group purchase mechanisms on the one 
hand versus subsidies and a reformed nongroup market on the other.
Suppose that instead of creating a new group purchasing entity, we 
gave the newly eligible subsidies and sent them off into a reformed 
nongroup market to purchase would they could. This approach would 
likely include some kind of community rating (CR) requirement, at 
least within age cohorts. Let h = the high-risk premium and c = the 
community rate. The idea is that the unsubsidized, those with incomes 
above 200 percent of poverty, say, could buy a policy at c. In that 
sense, you could say they were "community rate-protected," in that 
they would never pay more than c.
Because I am wary of trying to accomplish wholesale reform of the 
nongroup market in today's political climate, I recommended creating 
the separate group purchase mechanism and the types of subsidies I 
have described. But we could easily create a subsidy just for the
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amount above the community rate, h - c, for those who have incomes 
between 200 percent of poverty and 800 percent of poverty. That way, 
those with fair + poor health and incomes above 200 percent would pay 
c, the exact community rate they would have paid if we had reformed 
the nongroup market, but we could avoid the collateral damage to those 
whose premiums would have been increased. Presumably, most if not 
all of those in fair or poor health with reasonable incomes would gladly 
pay c to get guaranteed issue health insurance.
Table 7 reports the results of this type of subsidy. The first column 
is the same as column 3 from Table 6, the income + health status sub 
sidy. The "CR Protection alone" column reports what this h - c sub 
sidy does for those with incomes between 200 and 800 percent of 
poverty, and the final column combines it with the income + health sta 
tus subsidy we've already analyzed. There we see that the total cost is 
still modest, the target efficiency on those with fair or poor health is 
very good, and the overall target efficiency in cost per newly insured 
person is improved from that obtained with the income + health status 
subsidy without CR protection.
Finally, Table 8 compares the required net increase in average fed 
eral income tax rates necessary to finance the income + health status + 
CR protection subsidy (0.108 percent, that is, one-tenth of 1 percentage 
point) with the average premium increase in the nongroup market for 
55- to 64-year-olds if the same number of subsidized purchasers 
entered the nongroup market with guaranteed issue and community rat- 
Table 7 Simulated Results of Community-Rating Protection
Basis for subsidy
Newly covered (millions)
% of uninsured newly covered
% of uninsured in fair/poor health covered
Total cost ($, billions)























SOURCE: Author's calculations using CPS, NMES, MEPS, and other data.
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Table 8 Alternative "Tax" Rates from Subsidizing Low-Income 
+ High-Risk Protection (%)
Increase in average federal income tax rate required to 0.108 
finance Income + Health + CR
Increase in average premium from putting same number 23.9 
of high risk into nongroup market with CR
Share of nongroup market that would be high risk under 45.2 
reform
ing (23.9 percent). This large premium increase results because the 
fraction of nongroup purchasers who would be in fair or poor health in 
that cohort would basically double to 45.2 percent. I have no doubt the 
tiny income tax increase would cause much less disruption than this 
large premium increase, except perhaps in certain ideological circles 
which oppose all publicly financed coverage expansions.
CONCLUSIONS
The need for health insurance policy options for the 55-64 group is 
compelling now and is going to intensify as the baby boomers expand 
that cohort in the next decade. The financial risk of going without cov 
erage is high for members of this cohort, the health risks could be sub 
stantial (we do not know a great deal about this at the present time), 
and a traditional pillar of pre-Medicare coverage, employer-sponsored 
retiree coverage, is expected to continue to decline in prevalence.
Reasonably inexpensive and targeted subsidy programs can be 
devised and implemented that would go a long way toward covering 
the neediest near-elderly, those with low incomes and low health status. 
The subsidy and purchasing entity that achieves the best overall out 
come, in my view, has the virtue of highlighting the fact that subsidies 
most efficiently eradicate need when they reflect both income and 
health status dimensions of people's lives.
Researching and writing this paper has forced me to reflect on 
many dimensions of coverage expansion options. I would like to con 
clude by offering the following normative principles for health insur-
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ance subsidy policy that seem particularly applicable to the 55- to 64- 
year-old cohort and maybe others as well.
• No poor person should pay for health insurance. (Corollary: No 
person who makes more than 10 times poverty should tell a per 
son in poverty what that poor person can afford to pay.)
• No person with poor health should pay more than the actuarially 
fair community rate unless their income is high.
• The people of the United States can afford to offer substantial 
relief to 55- to 64-year-olds with low incomes who are also in bad 
heath, and indeed to most of those in poor health regardless of 
income.
• We can offer this relief with very modest income tax rate 
increases. This is a much less costly financing mechanism—in 
terms of social disruption—than forcing nongroup insurers to 
charge community rated premiums to all purchasers.
Notes
I am grateful to Kathy Swartz, Rich Johnson, Karen Pollitz, Alan Monheit, Marilyn 
Moon, Bo Garrett, Linda Blumberg, and Frank Sammartino for many helpful conversa 
tions and to Joseph Llobrera for timely research assistance. I remain solely responsible 
for all errors or omissions. The views expressed herein are mine alone and not those of 
the Urban Institute, its Trustees, or its sponsors. My address is 2100 M Street, NW, 
Washington, DC, 20037; (202)261-5697; lnichols@ui.urban.org.
1. See Johnson, Davidoff, and Perese (2000) for a summary of recent and ongoing 
work.
2. Berk and Monheit (1992) show that the distribution of health expenditures has 
been remarkably stable since 1929, so that the skewness (10 percent of the popu 
lation accounting for 70 percent of the spending) that was present in the 1987 data 
is very likely to still be present.
3. The hypothetical new program needs a name. For this cohort, all concepts are 
"near-something" (-Medicare, -work, -elderly, etc.). "Near" makes me think of 
something off in the distance, somehow better than what we have now. This all 
suggests Avalon, the mythical Arthurian island, shrouded in mist, where the Lady 
of Lake lives, where Arthur was taken after he was slain, and from whence Cam- 
elot will return, if it ever does. It could be the Avalon Purchasing Authority 
(APA), with apologies to the American Psychological Association.
4. In each case I assumed that a 100 percent subsidy would engender an 85 percent 
participation rate from the currently uninsured who were targeted, 90 percent
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from current nongroup purchasers who would be eligible, and 10 percent of cur 
rent ESI and RHI holders who are ineligible but expected to drift. I also assumed 
that participation would decline linearly as the subsidy falls to zero.
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